When fiscal consolidation meets private deleveraging
Andrés Domingo, Javier
Arce, Óscar
Thomas, Carlos

Fecha: 2016
Resumen: We analyze the interaction between fiscal consolidations and private sector deleveraging in an economy inside a monetary union. Pre-existing long-term collateralized private debt - a core ingredient of the deleveraging process - plays a critical role in shaping fiscal multipliers. By buffering the short-run fall in debtors' spending capacity, long-run private debt reduces the shortrun multipliers of aggressive (large and/or fast) consolidations. However, absent credibility concerns, aggressive consolidations raise the intensity and length of private deleveraging, causing higher output losses over the medium-run. In terms of discounted output losses and welfare, this latter effect dominates, so that larger and faster consolidations are relatively costlier than smaller and more gradual ones. Also, in this environment, alternative budgetary instruments generate sizable differences in terms of their incidence on private deleveraging dynamics and, hence, on their overall output costs of fiscal consolidations.
Resumen: The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
Ayudas: European Commission 649396
Derechos: Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. Creative Commons
Lengua: Anglès
Colección: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. ADEMU working paper series
Colección: ADEMU Working Paper Series ; 42
Documento: Working paper
Materia: Fiscal conditions ; Long-term private debt ; Financial shock

Adreça alternativa: https://hdl.handle.net/10230/27711


55 p, 726.6 KB

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 Registro creado el 2018-10-23, última modificación el 2024-03-13



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