| Data: |
2016 |
| Resum: |
This paper examines the optimal time-consistent unemployment insurance policy in a search economy with incomplete markets. In a context of repeated choice without a commitment device, we show that the optimal replacement rate depends on how frequently in time the policy can be revised. The exact relation is dependent on the political process: if the utilitarian welfare criterion is used, the optimal rate is higher the shorter the choice periodicity. Self-insurance reduces the need for the public scheme but mostly because the policy cannot be changed often enough. The comparison with an economy where a commitment device is assumed shows that the commitment rate is close to time-consistent rates with very long choice periodicities. |
| Resum: |
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. |
| Ajuts: |
European Commission 649396
|
| Drets: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.  |
| Llengua: |
Anglès |
| Col·lecció: |
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. ADEMU working paper series |
| Col·lecció: |
ADEMU Working Paper Series ; 46 |
| Document: |
Working paper |
| Matèria: |
Unemployment insurance ;
Time consistency ;
Commitment ;
Job search |
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