| Fecha: |
2016 |
| Resumen: |
We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with three interacting frictions: limited enforcement, limited commitment, and incomplete markets. A sovereign country in recession issues debt to smooth consumption and makes reforms to speed up recovery. The sovereign can renege on debt by suffering a stochastic cost, in which case debt is renegotiated. The competitive Markov equilibrium features large fluctuations in consumption and reform effort. We contrast the equilibrium with an optimal contract with one-sided commitment. A calibrated model can match several salient facts about debt crises. We quantify the welfare effect of relaxing different frictions. |
| Resumen: |
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. |
| Ayudas: |
European Commission 649396
|
| Derechos: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.  |
| Lengua: |
Anglès |
| Colección: |
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. ADEMU working paper series |
| Colección: |
ADEMU Working Paper Series ; 56 |
| Documento: |
Working paper |
| Materia: |
Austerity ;
Commitment ;
Debt overhang ;
Default ;
European debt crisis ;
Markov equilibrium ;
Moral hazard ;
Renegotiation ;
Risk premia ;
Risk sharing ;
Sovereign debt ;
Structural reforms |
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