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Articles 29 registres trobats  anterior11 - 20següent  anar al registre: La cerca s'ha fet en 0.01 segons. 
11.
19 p, 213.5 KB Bribe-proof rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 61 Núm. 2 (November 2007) , p. 331-343  
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12.
26 p, 329.1 KB A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0245-7
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 187-206  
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13.
20 p, 232.8 KB On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
For the many-to-one matching model with firms having substitutable and q-separable preferences we propose two very natural binary operations that together with the unanimous partial ordering of the workers endow the set of stable matchings with a lattice structure. [...]
2001 - 10.1080/02331930108844574
Optimization, Vol. 50 Núm. 5-6 (January 2001) , p. 439-457  
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14.
44 p, 312.1 KB An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have substitutable preferences. The algorithm starts by calculating the two optimal stable matchings using the deferred-acceptance algorithm. [...]
2004 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.002
Mathematical social sciences, Vol. 47 Núm. 2 (March 2004) , p. 187-210  
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15.
27 p, 257.0 KB The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one maching model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The Blocking Lemma identifies a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. [...]
2010 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.010
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol. 46 Núm. 5 (September 2010) , p. 937-949  
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16.
15 p, 190.9 KB Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. [...]
2000 - 10.1006/jeth.1999.2586
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 91 Núm. 1 (March 2000) , p. 91-105  
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17.
29 p, 245.3 KB On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)))
For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. [...]
2007 - 10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7
International journal of game theory, Vol. 36 Núm. 3 (October 2007) , p. 497-518  
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18.
19 p, 282.5 KB On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one maching model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)))
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s001820400189
International journal of game theory, Vol. 33 Núm. 1 (Decemberq 2004) , p. 115-128  
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19.
26 p, 248.5 KB On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. [...]
2012 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.011
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 74 Núm. 2 (March 2012) , p. 588-600  
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20.
33 p, 298.2 KB The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria / Jaume, Daniel (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4
Mathematical methods of operations research, Vol. 76 Núm. 2 (October 2012) , p. 161-187  
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Articles : 29 registres trobats   anterior11 - 20següent  anar al registre:
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1 Neme, Alejandro José
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