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Articles 29 registres trobats  inicianterior17 - 26següent  anar al registre: La cerca s'ha fet en 0.01 segons. 
17.
29 p, 245.3 KB On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)))
For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. [...]
2007 - 10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7
International journal of game theory, Vol. 36 Núm. 3 (October 2007) , p. 497-518  
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18.
19 p, 282.5 KB On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one maching model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)))
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s001820400189
International journal of game theory, Vol. 33 Núm. 1 (Decemberq 2004) , p. 115-128  
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19.
26 p, 248.5 KB On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. [...]
2012 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.011
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 74 Núm. 2 (March 2012) , p. 588-600  
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20.
33 p, 298.2 KB The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria / Jaume, Daniel (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4
Mathematical methods of operations research, Vol. 76 Núm. 2 (October 2012) , p. 161-187  
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21.
43 p, 342.5 KB The division problem with voluntary participation / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00355-011-0530-9
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 38 Núm. 3 (March 2012) , p. 371-406  
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22.
29 p, 345.3 KB The division problem with maximal capacity constraints / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6
Series, Vol. 3 Núm. 1 (March 2012) , p. 29-57  
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23.
32 p, 305.8 KB Stability and voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 229-247  
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24.
32 p, 277.3 KB An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide either stay or exit the society. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004
Mathematical social sciences, Vol. 54 Núm. 2 (September 2007) , p. 152-175  
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25.
24 p, 238.4 KB On exiting after voting / Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. [...]
2006 - 10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2
International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 Núm. 1 (2006) , p. 33-54  
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26.
21 p, 235.4 KB Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.
1999 - 10.1007/s003550050146
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 16 Núm. 2 (1999) , p. 321-336  
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Articles : 29 registres trobats   inicianterior17 - 26següent  anar al registre:
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1 Neme, Alejandro José
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