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Articles 49 records found  previous11 - 20nextend  jump to record: Search took 0.01 seconds. 
11.
23 p, 342.8 KB On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships : Strategy-proofness / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 48, Núm. 4 (2017) , p. 857-875  
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12.
40 p, 432.7 KB Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. [...]
2016 - 10.3982/TE1910
Theoretical economics, Vol. 11, Núm. 2 (2016) , p. 547-586
2 documents
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13.
23 p, 427.0 KB Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems : The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés (University of Oxford) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. [...]
2015 - 10.1007/s11238-014-9467-7
Theory and decision, Vol. 79, Núm. 2 (2015) , p. 227-250  
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14.
40 p, 301.1 KB The Division Problem under Constraints / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 89 (2015) , p. 56-77  
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15.
35 p, 428.9 KB Matching Markets under (In)complete Information / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 157 (2015) , p. 295-314  
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16.
33 p, 477.2 KB On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (University of Manchester) ; Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute) ; Sharma, Tradib (Centro de Investigación Económica (México)) ; Ülkü, Levent (Centro de Investigación Económica (México))
We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 155 (2015) , p. 30-49  
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17.
39 p, 288.8 KB On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game : limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. [...]
2014 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 154 (2014) , p. 185-215  
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18.
20 p, 306.3 KB On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina))
We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many-to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik's (1971) assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability, and two alternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. [...]
2014 - 10.1155/2014/190614
Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014  
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19.
55 p, 354.5 KB La moderna teoria de l'elecció social : de la impossibilitat a la possibilitat / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Es presenten els dos teoremes d'impossibilitat més importants de la moderna teoria de l'elecció social: el teorema d'Arrow per a funcions de benestar social no dictatorials que satisfan el principi de Pareto i la propietat de la independència d'alternatives irrellevants, i el teorema de Gibbard-Satterthwaite per a funcions d'elecció social no trivials i no manipulables. [...]
We present the two most important impossibility theorems of the modern social choice theory: Arrow's theorem for social welfare functions satisfying the Pareto principle and the independence of irrelevant alternatives property, and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem for non-trivial and strategy-proof social choice functions. [...]
2012 - 10.2436/20.2002.01.45
Butlletí de la Societat Catalana de Matemàtiques, Vol. 27, Num. 2 (2012) , p. 177-231  
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20.
10 p, 832.0 KB The theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012 was awarded jointly to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley for their contributions to the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. [...]
2015 - 10.2436/20.7010.01.218
Contributions to science, Vol. 11, Núm. 1 (2015)  
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Articles : 49 records found   previous11 - 20nextend  jump to record:
See also: similar author names
113 Massò, Jordi
1 Massó, Jaume
1 Massó, Jaume,
6 Massó, Jordi,
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