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Articles 49 records found  beginprevious34 - 43next  jump to record: Search took 0.01 seconds. 
34.
13 p, 183.2 KB Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model / Klijn, Flip (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
In this note we introduce weak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. The new concept is based on threats within blocking pairs: an individually rational matching is weakly stable if for every blocking pair one of the members can find a more attractive partner with whom he forms another blocking pair for the original matching. [...]
2003 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00534-1
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 42 Núm. 1 (January 2003) , p. 91-100  
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35.
33 p, 298.2 KB The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria / Jaume, Daniel (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4
Mathematical methods of operations research, Vol. 76 Núm. 2 (October 2012) , p. 161-187  
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36.
10 p, 260.7 KB Some things couples wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) / Klaus, Bettina (Maastricht University. Department of Economics) ; Klijn, Flip (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. [...]
2007 - 10.1007/s10058-006-0017-9
Review of economic design, Núm. 11 (2007) , p. 175-184  
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37.
27 p, 240.7 KB Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de Sciences Économiques.) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
Journal of economic theory, Núm. 136 (2007) , p. 587-600  
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38.
16 p, 177.6 KB Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues / Dutta, Bhaskar (Indian Statistical Institute) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. [...]
1997 - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2291
Journal of economic theory, Núm. 75 (1997) , p. 464-475  
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39.
43 p, 342.5 KB The division problem with voluntary participation / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00355-011-0530-9
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 38 Núm. 3 (March 2012) , p. 371-406  
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40.
29 p, 345.3 KB The division problem with maximal capacity constraints / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6
Series, Vol. 3 Núm. 1 (March 2012) , p. 29-57  
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41.
26 p, 243.8 KB The chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the Ω-value introduced by Bergantiños, Casas- Méndez, and Vázquez-Brage (2000). [...]
2002 - 10.1007/s001860200193
Mathematical methods of operations research, Vol. 56 Núm. 2 (October 2002) , p. 269-286  
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42.
32 p, 305.8 KB Stability and voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 229-247  
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43.
32 p, 277.3 KB An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide either stay or exit the society. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004
Mathematical social sciences, Vol. 54 Núm. 2 (September 2007) , p. 152-175  
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Articles : 49 records found   beginprevious34 - 43next  jump to record:
See also: similar author names
113 Massò, Jordi
1 Massó, Jaume
1 Massó, Jaume,
6 Massó, Jordi,
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