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30 p, 322.3 KB On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets / Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira (Universidade de São Paulo)
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
International journal of game theory, 2017, p. 1-25  

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