Published articles

Published articles 1 records found  Search took 0.01 seconds. 
1.
34 p, 343.2 KB On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés (London School of Economics)
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. [...]
2011 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 72 Núm. 2 (2011) , p. 467-484  

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