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Documents de recerca	29 registres trobats 11 - 20 anar al registre:	La cerca s'ha fet en 0.00 segons.

11.

28 p, 199.0 KB

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game / Abbink, Klaus (University of Amsterdam) ; Brandts, Jordi (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica) ; Herrmann, Benedikt (University of Nottingham) ; Orzen, Henrik (University of Nottingham) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. [...]
2008 (Working papers ; 723.08)

12.

32 p, 349.6 KB

Constrained school choice / Haeringer, Guillaume ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 671.06)

13.

34 p, 317.1 KB

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme / Haeringer, Guillaume ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 471.00)

14.

30 p, 282.3 KB

Voting by committees under constraints / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
2006 (Working papers ; 501.01)

15.

28 p, 245.3 KB

Voting by committees with exit / Berga, Dolors ; Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 511.02)

16.

15 p, 224.9 KB

Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Ehlers, Lars ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 512.02)

17.

40 p, 488.5 KB

The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium : an experimental study / Aragonès, Enriqueta ; Palfrey, Thomas R. ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 530.02)

18.

26 p, 290.6 KB

Stable condorcet rules / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Beviá, Carmen ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of the facilities. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 539.02)

19.