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Documents de recerca	24 registres trobats 14 - 23 anar al registre:	La cerca s'ha fet en 0.02 segons.

14.

18 p, 207.8 KB

Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment / Fiestras Janeiro, M. Gloria ; Klijn, Flip ; Sánchez, Estela ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.
2006 (Working papers ; 561.03)

15.

16 p, 239.2 KB

Procedurally fair and stable matching / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al. , 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 582.03)

16.

9 p, 155.3 KB

Distribution center consolidation games / Klijn, Flip ; Slikker, Marco ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 602.04)

17.

18 p, 225.2 KB

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 604.04)

18.

25 p, 298.1 KB

Fair and efficient student placement with couples / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 616.04)

19.

9 p, 187.5 KB

Sequencing games without initial order / Klijn, Flip ; Sánchez, Estela ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i. e. , 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 622.04)

20.

8 p, 178.4 KB

A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects / Hamers, Herbert ; Klijn, Flip ; Slikker, Marco ; Van Velzen, Bas ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 624.04)

21.

13 p, 236.2 KB

Employment by lotto revisited / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al. , 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al. 's analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 627.04)

22.

5 p, 145.5 KB

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 628.04)

23.

11 p, 198.7 KB

Median stable matching for college admission / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.
2006 (Working papers ; 632.04)