Documents de recerca

Documents de recerca 35 registres trobats  inicianterior21 - 30següent  anar al registre: La cerca s'ha fet en 0.01 segons. 
21.
28 p, 978.9 KB The principal-agent matching market / Dam, Kaniska ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 503.01)  
22.
26 p, 306.1 KB Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements / Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 515.02)  
23.
36 p, 365.4 KB An ordinal shapley value for economic environments / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 560.03)  
24.
7 p, 156.3 KB Forming efficient networks / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.
2006 (Working papers ; 609.04)  
25.
29 p, 282.2 KB Sharing the surplus : a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities / Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 611.04)  
26.
26 p, 338.5 KB Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes / Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 612.04)  
27.
32 p, 337.3 KB An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version) / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 634.04)  
28.
41 p, 310.1 KB Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Ferenc, Veszteg Róbert ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 638.05)  
29.
23 p, 250.7 KB Efficient bidding with externalities / Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 641.05)  
30.
10 p, 146.8 KB Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.
2006 (Working papers ; 647.05)  

Documents de recerca : 35 registres trobats   inicianterior21 - 30següent  anar al registre:
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48 Pérez-Castrillo, David
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