Research literature

Research literature 34 records found  previous11 - 20nextend  jump to record: Search took 0.01 seconds. 
11.
10 p, 245.8 KB Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) / Klaus, Bettina (Maastricht University. Department of Economics) ; Klijn, Flip (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica.
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. [...]
Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2005 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 78)  
12.
44 p, 336.8 KB Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability / Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three nec- essary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2014 (Working papers ; 946.14)  
13.
39 p, 263.8 KB The Division problem under constraints / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single- peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 942.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series; 745)  
14.
17 p, 187.1 KB Stable partitions in many division problems : the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 941.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series ; 739)  
15.
36 p, 295.1 KB On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game / Arribillaga, Pablo R. ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 940.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series; 740)  
16.
26 p, 1.3 MB El trasplante renal cruzado con múltiples donantes / Rosales Calandre, Aina ; Massó, Jordi, dir. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Se describen los aspectos fundamentales de la insuficiencia renal, los principales tratamientos para tratar a los pacientes de esta enfermedad, y las compatibilidades que deben existir entre el paciente y el riñón del donante para poder realizar un trasplante. [...]
Es descriuen els aspectes fonamentals de la insuficiència renal, els principals tractaments per tractar als pacients d'aquesta malaltia, i les compatibilitats que han d'existir entre el pacient i el ronyó del donant per poder realitzar el trasplantament. [...]

2014
Grau en Economia [952]  
17.
89 p, 474.4 KB Three essays on weak condorcet winners, public bads, and contrast campaigns / Ayllón Aragón, Grisel ; Massó, Jordi, dir. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada
Estudiamos los mecanismos a partir de los cuales los miembros de una sociedad deciden sobre cuestiones colectivas. Cada agente tiene preferencias distintas, pero la sociedad ha de tomar una única decisión colectiva. [...]
We study mechanisms by which the members of a society choose a social alternative. Each agent has his own preferences, but still the society has to select a unique alternative. Which characteristics ought to have a preference profile in order to admit the existence of a majority winner? Which rules are appropriate to decide over the location of a public bad such as a dumpsite, a jail, or a nuclear plant? What are the purposes of political campaigns where candidates do not limit themselves to make promises to voters about their own policies, but also about those of their rivals? The aim of this work is to study the aggregation of individual preferences in such cases. [...]

Bellaterra : Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Department of Economics and Economy History, 2012  
18.
35 p, 248.6 KB On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game : limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria / Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 810.10)  
19.
32 p, 302.3 KB On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 809.10)  
20.
40 p, 289.7 KB The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands : competitive equilibria / Jaume, Daniel ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 808.10)  

Research literature : 34 records found   previous11 - 20nextend  jump to record:
See also: similar author names
113 Massò, Jordi
1 Massó, Jaume
1 Massó, Jaume,
6 Massó, Jordi,
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