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Documentos de investigación	Encontrados 19 registros 11 - 19 ir al registro:	La búsqueda tardó 0.00 segundos.

11.

40 p, 289.7 KB

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands : competitive equilibria / Jaume, Daniel ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 808.10)

12.

41 p, 295.7 KB

The Division problem with voluntary participation / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 807.10)

13.

20 p, 4.1 MB

14.

22 p, 266.0 KB

15.

30 p, 282.3 KB

Voting by committees under constraints / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
2006 (Working papers ; 501.01)

16.

28 p, 245.3 KB

Voting by committees with exit / Berga, Dolors ; Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 511.02)

17.

24 p, 303.7 KB

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 535.02)

18.

21 p, 272.9 KB

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 571.03)

19.

45 p, 397.5 KB

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model / Martínez, Ruth ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Oviedo, Jorge ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 577.03)

Vea también: autores con nombres similares
1	Neme, Alejandro José

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