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Documentos de investigación	Encontrados 34 registros 19 - 28 ir al registro:	La búsqueda tardó 0.01 segundos.

19.

32 p, 302.3 KB

On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 809.10)

20.

40 p, 289.7 KB

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands : competitive equilibria / Jaume, Daniel ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 808.10)

21.

41 p, 295.7 KB

The Division problem with voluntary participation / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 807.10)

22.

37 p, 271.0 KB

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / Massó, Jordi ; Nicolò, Antonio ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 714.07)

23.

30 p, 255.0 KB

Weighted approval voting / Massó, Jordi ; Vorsatz, Marc ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 668.06)

24.

20 p, 4.1 MB

25.

18 p, 250.8 KB

26.

22 p, 266.0 KB

27.

30 p, 282.3 KB

Voting by committees under constraints / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
2006 (Working papers ; 501.01)

28.

28 p, 245.3 KB

Voting by committees with exit / Berga, Dolors ; Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 511.02)