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Documentos de investigación	Encontrados 41 registros 29 - 38 ir al registro:	La búsqueda tardó 0.00 segundos.

29.

43 p, 479.0 KB

Competition with forward contracts : a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design / Brandts, Jordi ; Pezanis-Christou, Paul ; Schram, Arthur ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 581.03)

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30.

41 p, 2.8 MB

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle : an experimental investigation / Brandts, Jordi ; Cabrales, Antonio, 1964- ; Charness, Gary ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 586.03)

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31.

54 p, 359.5 KB

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations / Brandts, Jordi ; Cooper, David J. ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 606.04) - DOI (Digital Object Identifier)

10.1257/aer.96.3.669

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32.

44 p, 281.6 KB

Competition and well-being / Brandts, Jordi ; Riedl, Arno ; Winden, Frans van ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 608.04)

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33.

39 p, 671.0 KB

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance / Guillén Álvarez, Pablo ; Brandts, Jordi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 618.04)

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34.

32 p, 94.0 KB

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations / Brandts, Jordi ; Cooper, David J. ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 630.04)

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35.

46 p, 296.3 KB

It's what you say not what you pay / Brandts, Jordi ; Cooper, David J. ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 643.05)

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36.

21 p, 229.0 KB

Collusion in growing and shrinking markets : empirical evidence from experimental duopolies / Abbink, Klaus ; Brandts, Jordi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 648.05)

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37.

27 p, 147.6 KB

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment / Brandts, Jordi ; Charness, Gary ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 454.00)

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38.

139 p, 542.7 KB

Economic action and reference points : an experimental analysis / Solà i Belda, Carles ; Brandts, Jordi, dir. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Aquesta tesi analitza diversos aspectes de les motivacions individuals i de les seves implicacions en processos econòmics. Específicament, analitzo en detall criteris normatius que poden aplicar els individus com són els de justícia i reciprocitat. [...]
This thesis analyzes several aspects of the motivations that drive individuals and their implications in economic processes. In particular, I analyze in detail normative criteria that individuals apply such as those of fairness and reciprocity. [...]
Bellaterra : Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2001

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