Documentos de investigación

Buscar colecciones:

Ordenar por:	Mostrar resultados:	Formato de visualización:

Documentos de investigación	Encontrados 39 registros 11 - 20 ir al registro:	La búsqueda tardó 0.00 segundos.

11.

59 p, 597.0 KB

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups / Guo, Bing ; Lou, Yun ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. [...]
2012 (Working papers ; 895.12)

12.

32 p, 293.7 KB

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues / Diamantoudi, Effrosyni ; Macho Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Xue, Licun ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 880.11)

13.

41 p, 384.9 KB

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets / Macho Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 872.11)

14.

35 p, 313.5 KB

Smooth multibidding mechanisms / Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Quérou, Nicolas ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is "smoother" in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 849.10)

15.

18 p, 55.3 KB

Incentives in university technology transfers / Macho Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.
2009 (Working papers ; 785.09) - DOI (Digital Object Identifier)

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.02.009
International journal of industrial organization, Vol. 28 (2010), p. 362-367

16.

20 p, 277.0 KB

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information / Clippel, Geoffroy de ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 813.10)

17.

18 p, 229.3 KB

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities / Macho Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. [...]
2008 (Working papers ; 758.08)

18.

40 p, 332.0 KB

Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers / Alonso-Paulí, Eduard ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. [...]
2008 (Working papers ; 726.08)

19.