Berga, Dolors - Resultats de la cerca - Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB

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Resultats globals: 13 registres trobats en 0.01 segons.
Articles, 4 registres trobats Documents de recerca, 4 registres trobats Materials acadèmics, 5 registres trobats

Articles	4 registres trobats

32 p, 305.8 KB

Stability and voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2004 - DOI (Digital Object Identifier)

10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 229-247

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32 p, 277.3 KB

An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide either stay or exit the society. [...]
2007 - DOI (Digital Object Identifier)

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004
Mathematical social sciences, Vol. 54 Núm. 2 (September 2007) , p. 152-175

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24 p, 238.4 KB

On exiting after voting / Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. [...]
2006 - DOI (Digital Object Identifier)

10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2
International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 Núm. 1 (2006) , p. 33-54

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9 p, 128.9 KB

On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit / Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. [...]
2008
Economics bulletin, Vol. 4 Núm. 21 (2008) , p. 1-9

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Documents de recerca	4 registres trobats

30 p, 379.3 KB

Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness : on what domains are they also sufficient? / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Berga, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. [...]
2012 (Working papers ; 892.11)

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22 p, 195.6 KB

Group strategy-proof social choice functions / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Berga, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 853.10)

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32 p, 330.9 KB

Individual versus group strategy-proofness : when do they coincide? / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Berga, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. [...]
2009 (Working papers ; 761.09)

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28 p, 245.3 KB

Voting by committees with exit / Berga, Dolors ; Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 511.02)

Registre complet -