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Resultats globals: 18 registres trobats en 0.02 segons.
Articles, 12 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 6 registres trobats
Articles 12 registres trobats  1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
1.
20 p, 299.3 KB On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships : Internal Stability and Consistency / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
2018 - 10.1007/s11238-017-9644-6
Theory and decision, 2018  
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2.
23 p, 342.8 KB On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships : Strategy-proofness / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 48, Núm. 4 (2017) , p. 857-875  
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3.
23 p, 427.0 KB Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems : The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés (University of Oxford) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. [...]
2015 - 10.1007/s11238-014-9467-7
Theory and decision, Vol. 79, Núm. 2 (2015) , p. 227-250  
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4.
40 p, 301.1 KB The Division Problem under Constraints / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 89 (2015) , p. 56-77  
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5.
15 p, 190.9 KB Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. [...]
2000 - 10.1006/jeth.1999.2586
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 91 Núm. 1 (March 2000) , p. 91-105  
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6.
43 p, 342.5 KB The division problem with voluntary participation / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00355-011-0530-9
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 38 Núm. 3 (March 2012) , p. 371-406  
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7.
29 p, 345.3 KB The division problem with maximal capacity constraints / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6
Series, Vol. 3 Núm. 1 (March 2012) , p. 29-57  
Registre complet - Creative Commons
8.
26 p, 243.8 KB The chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the Ω-value introduced by Bergantiños, Casas- Méndez, and Vázquez-Brage (2000). [...]
2002 - 10.1007/s001860200193
Mathematical methods of operations research, Vol. 56 Núm. 2 (October 2002) , p. 269-286  
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9.
32 p, 305.8 KB Stability and voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 229-247  
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10.
32 p, 277.3 KB An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide either stay or exit the society. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004
Mathematical social sciences, Vol. 54 Núm. 2 (September 2007) , p. 152-175  
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Articles : 12 registres trobats   1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
Documents de recerca 6 registres trobats  
1.
43 p, 389.2 KB Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. [...]
2019 (MPRA paper ; 97136)  
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2.
39 p, 263.8 KB The Division problem under constraints / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single- peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 942.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series; 745)  
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3.
17 p, 187.1 KB Stable partitions in many division problems : the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 941.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series ; 739)  
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4.
41 p, 295.7 KB The Division problem with voluntary participation / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 807.10)  
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5.
18 p, 250.8 KB The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
2006 (Working papers ; 456.00)  
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6.
28 p, 245.3 KB Voting by committees with exit / Berga, Dolors ; Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 511.02)  
Registre complet - Creative Commons

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