Resultats globals: 4 registres trobats en 0.01 segons.
Documents de recerca, 4 registres trobats
Documents de recerca 4 registres trobats  
1.
28 p, 237.9 KB Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources / Casari, Marco ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 542.02)  
2.
29 p, 262.8 KB Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints / Casari, Marco ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 583.03)  
3.
31 p, 404.4 KB Sequencing lifeline repairs after an earthquake : an economic approach / Casari, Marco ; Wilkie, Simon ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Recoveries after recent earthquakes in the U. S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the management of natural disasters and discuss issues related to the application to seismic event recovery. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 587.03)  
4.
16 p, 344.8 KB On the design of peer punishment experiments / Casari, Marco ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the "fine-to-fee" ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 615.04)  

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