Resultats globals: 2 registres trobats en 0.03 segons.
Articles, 1 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 1 registres trobats
Articles 1 registres trobats  
1.
20 p, 607.8 KB Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information / Clippel, Geoffroy de (Brown University) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were un-der complete information. [...]
2012
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 75, Num. 1 (2012) , p. 413-423  

Documents de recerca 1 registres trobats  
1.
20 p, 277.0 KB Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information / Clippel, Geoffroy de ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 813.10)  

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