Resultados globales: 6 registros encontrados en 0.02 segundos.
Artículos, Encontrados 2 registros
Documentos de investigación, Encontrados 4 registros
Artículos Encontrados 2 registros  
1.
35 p, 428.9 KB Matching Markets under (In)complete Information / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 157 (2015) , p. 295-314  
2.
27 p, 240.7 KB Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de Sciences Économiques.) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
Journal of economic theory, Núm. 136 (2007) , p. 587-600  

Documentos de investigación Encontrados 4 registros  
1.
23 p, 238.7 KB Incomplete information and small cores in matching markets / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal.Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. [...]
[S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 147)  
2.
15 p, 224.9 KB Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Ehlers, Lars ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 512.02)  
3.
12 p, 204.7 KB Efficient priority rules / Ehlers, Lars ; Klaus, Bettina ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 554.02)  
4.
20 p, 236.4 KB Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems / Ehlers, Lars ; Klaus, Bettina ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e. g. , houses, jobs, offices, etc. ) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 566.03)  

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