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1.
10 p, 260.7 KB Some things couples wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) / Klaus, Bettina (Maastricht University. Department of Economics) ; Klijn, Flip (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. [...]
2007 - 10.1007/s10058-006-0017-9
Review of economic design, Núm. 11 (2007) , p. 175-184  

Documents de recerca 17 registres trobats  1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
1.
10 p, 245.8 KB Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) / Klaus, Bettina (Maastricht University. Department of Economics) ; Klijn, Flip (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica.
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. [...]
Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2005 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 78)  
2.
17 p, 194.2 KB Local and global consistency properties for student placement / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 866.11)  
3.
5 p, 158.4 KB Corrigendum : stable matchings and preferences of couples / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Nakamura, Toshifumi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 708.07)  
4.
9 p, 180.7 KB Smith and Rawls share a room / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ``lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 706.07)  
5.
4 p, 132.8 KB The Evolution of roommate networks : a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Walzl, Markus ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We extend Jackson and Watts's (2002) result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from marriage problems to roommate problems. In particular, we show that the existence of a side-optimal core stable network, on which the proof of Jackson and Watts (2002) hinges, is not crucial for their result.
2007 (Working papers ; 694.07)  
6.
42 p, 517.9 KB Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
It is well-known that couples that look jointly for jobs in the same centralized labor market may cause instabilities. We demonstrate that for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of responsive preferences, the existence of stable matchings can easily be established. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 552.02)  
7.
12 p, 204.7 KB Efficient priority rules / Ehlers, Lars ; Klaus, Bettina ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 554.02)  
8.
20 p, 236.4 KB Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems / Ehlers, Lars ; Klaus, Bettina ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e. g. , houses, jobs, offices, etc. ) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 566.03)  
9.
16 p, 239.2 KB Procedurally fair and stable matching / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al. , 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 582.03)  
10.
17 p, 260.8 KB Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods / Atlamaz, Murat ; Klaus, Bettina ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 598.04)  

Documents de recerca : 17 registres trobats   1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
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1 Klaus, Bernd
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