Resultats globals: 40 registres trobats en 0.02 segons.
Articles, 26 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 14 registres trobats
Articles 26 registres trobats  1 - 10següentfinal  anar al registre:
1.
20 p, 299.3 KB On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships : Internal Stability and Consistency / Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidad de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
2018
Theory and decision, 2018  
2.
23 p, 342.8 KB On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships : Strategy-proofness / Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidad de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 48, Núm. 4 (2017) , p. 857-875  
3.
23 p, 427.0 KB Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems : The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions / Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidad de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés (University of Oxford) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. [...]
2015 - 10.1007/s11238-014-9467-7
Theory and decision, Vol. 79, Núm. 2 (2015) , p. 227-250  
4.
40 p, 301.1 KB The Division Problem under Constraints / Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 89 (2015) , p. 56-77  
5.
39 p, 288.8 KB On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game : limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. [...]
2014 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 154 (2014) , p. 185-215  
6.
20 p, 306.3 KB On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina))
We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many-to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik’s (1971) assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability, and two alternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. [...]
2014
Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014  
7.
41 p, 254.2 KB Maximal domain of preferences for the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2001 - 10.1006/game.2001.0850
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 37 Núm. 2 (November 2001) , p. 367-387  
8.
19 p, 213.5 KB Bribe-proof rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 61 Núm. 2 (November 2007) , p. 331-343  
9.
26 p, 329.1 KB A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0245-7
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 187-206  
10.
20 p, 232.8 KB On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
For the many-to-one matching model with firms having substitutable and q-separable preferences we propose two very natural binary operations that together with the unanimous partial ordering of the workers endow the set of stable matchings with a lattice structure. [...]
2001
Optimization, Vol. 50 Núm. 5-6 (January 2001) , p. 439-457  

Articles : 26 registres trobats   1 - 10següentfinal  anar al registre:
Documents de recerca 14 registres trobats  1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
1.
27 p, 263.7 KB On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis) ; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference pro. les into subsets with the property that all preference pro. les in the same subset have the same Core. [...]
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2009 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 390)  
2.
39 p, 263.8 KB The Division problem under constraints / Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single- peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 942.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series; 745)  
3.
17 p, 187.1 KB Stable partitions in many division problems : the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 941.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series ; 739)  
4.
36 p, 295.1 KB On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game / Arribillaga, Pablo R. ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 940.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series; 740)  
5.
35 p, 248.6 KB On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game : limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria / Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 810.10)  
6.
40 p, 289.7 KB The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands : competitive equilibria / Jaume, Daniel ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 808.10)  
7.
41 p, 295.7 KB The Division problem with voluntary participation / Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 807.10)  
8.
20 p, 4.1 MB Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem. / Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
2006 (Working papers ; 434.99)  
9.
22 p, 266.0 KB An algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings. / Martínez, Ruth ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Oviedo, Jorge ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
2006 (Working papers ; 457.00)  
10.
30 p, 282.3 KB Voting by committees under constraints / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
2006 (Working papers ; 501.01)  

Documents de recerca : 14 registres trobats   1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
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