Results overview: Found 5 records in 0.02 seconds.
Articles, 2 records found
Research literature, 2 records found
Course materials, 1 records found
Articles 2 records found  
1.
33 p, 477.2 KB On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (University of Manchester) ; Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute) ; Sharma, Tradib (Centro de Investigación Económica (México)) ; Ülkü, Levent (Centro de Investigación Económica (México))
We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 155 (2015) , p. 30-49  
2.
34 p, 285.9 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova)
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. [...]
2008 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.007
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 64 Núm. 2 (November 2008) , p. 591-611  

Research literature 2 records found  
1.
29 p, 310.9 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under crowding preferences / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. [...]
[S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 148)  
2.
37 p, 271.0 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / Massó, Jordi ; Nicolò, Antonio ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 714.07)  

Course materials 1 records found  
1.
2 p, 7.3 KB Microeconomia Avançada II [25170] / Fradera, Isabel ; Nicoló, Antonio ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials
1998-99
Llicenciat en Economia [188]  

See also: similar author names
6 Nicoló, Antonio
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