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34 p, 1.2 MB Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets / McFadden, Daniel (University of California. Department of Economics) ; Noton, Carlos (Universidad de Chile. Departmento de Ingeniería Industrial) ; Olivella, Pau (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating in which a single insurer monopolizes the high risks while the rest attract the low risks, all at positive profits. [...]
2015 - 10.1007/s13209-015-0126-1
Series, Vol. 6 (2015) , p. 247-278  

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