Results overview: Found 6 records in 0.02 seconds.
Research literature, 6 records found
Research literature 6 records found  
1.
47 p, 701.9 KB Organisational structure, communication and group ethics / Ellman, Matthew ; Pezanis-Christou, Paul ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 682.07)  
2.
39 p, 251.2 KB Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments / Pezanis-Christou, Paul ; Romeu Santana, Andrés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 531.02)  
3.
23 p, 127.9 KB Auctions for government securities : a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs / Abbink, Klaus ; Brandts, Jordi ; Pezanis-Christou, Paul ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 551.02)  
4.
34 p, 245.8 KB Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty : a laboratory analysis / Neugebauer, Tibor ; Pezanis-Christou, Paul ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 558.03)  
5.
34 p, 404.2 KB Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions / Pezanis-Christou, Paul ; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 578.03)  
6.
43 p, 479.0 KB Competition with forward contracts : a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design / Brandts, Jordi ; Pezanis-Christou, Paul ; Schram, Arthur ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 581.03)  

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