Resultats globals: 2 registres trobats en 0.01 segons.
Articles, 2 registres trobats
Articles 2 registres trobats  
1.
28 p, 694.1 KB The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically / Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira (Universidade de São Paulo)
We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer–seller market of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. [...]
2016 - 10.1007/s00199-016-0997-9
Economic theory, September 2016, p. 1-21  
2.
30 p, 322.3 KB On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets / Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira (Universidade de São Paulo)
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
International journal of game theory, 2017, p. 1-25  

Vegeu també: autors amb noms similars
2 Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
Us interessa rebre alertes sobre nous resultats d'aquesta cerca?
Definiu una alerta personal via correu electrònic o subscribiu-vos al canal RSS.