Resultados globales: 3 registros encontrados en 0.02 segundos.
Artículos, Encontrados 2 registros
Documentos de investigación, Encontrados 1 registros
Artículos Encontrados 2 registros  
1.
38 p, 701.6 KB Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues / Diamantoudi, Effrosyny (Concordia University) ; Macho-Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Xue, Licun (McGill University)
We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues, that is, the amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the players are organized on all the issues. [...]
2015 - 10.1007/s00199-015-0867-x
Economic theory, Vol. 60, Num. 2 (2015) , p. 315-343  
2.
25 p, 576.5 KB Winners and losers from the gradual formation of trading blocs / Macho-Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Xue, Licun (McGill University)
Although global free trade is efficient, each country's benefit from free trade depends on the path that leads to the global free trade agreement. Using a dynamic model of trading bloc formation, we show that when global free trade is reached gradually the countries that are initially excluded gain less than the rest and may be even made worse off by the final free trade agreement than they were in the initial state of no trading blocs.
2007 - 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00589.x
Economica, Vol. 74, Núm. 296 (2007) , p. 664-681  

Documentos de investigación Encontrados 1 registros  
1.
32 p, 293.7 KB Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues / Diamantoudi, Effrosyni ; Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Xue, Licun ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 880.11)  

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