Resultats globals: 17 registres trobats en 0.03 segons.
Articles, 4 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 13 registres trobats
Articles 4 registres trobats  
1.
20 p, 232.8 KB On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
For the many-to-one matching model with firms having substitutable and q-separable preferences we propose two very natural binary operations that together with the unanimous partial ordering of the workers endow the set of stable matchings with a lattice structure. [...]
2001
Optimization, Vol. 50 Núm. 5-6 (January 2001) , p. 439-457  
2.
44 p, 312.1 KB An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have substitutable preferences. The algorithm starts by calculating the two optimal stable matchings using the deferred-acceptance algorithm. [...]
2004 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.002
Mathematical social sciences, Vol. 47 Núm. 2 (March 2004) , p. 187-210  
3.
27 p, 257.0 KB The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one maching model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The Blocking Lemma identifies a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. [...]
2010 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.010
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol. 46 Núm. 5 (September 2010) , p. 937-949  
4.
15 p, 190.9 KB Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. [...]
2000 - 10.1006/jeth.1999.2586
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 91 Núm. 1 (March 2000) , p. 91-105  

Documents de recerca 13 registres trobats  1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
1.
120 p, 776.6 KB Essays on two-sided markets and venture capitalist compensation / Sun, Keke ; Hurkens, Sjaak ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica
Esta tesis contribuye a la literatura sobre plataformas bilaterales y compensaciones a gestores de capital de riesgo. Las plataformas bilaterales reúnen dos grupos de usuarios interdependientes entre sí, y permiten cierta interacción entre ellos. [...]
This thesis contributes to the literature on two-sided platforms and venture capitalist compensation. Two-sided platforms bring two groups interdependent users together, and enable certain interactions between them. [...]

[Barcelona] : Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2015  
2.
27 p, 263.7 KB On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference pro. les into subsets with the property that all preference pro. les in the same subset have the same Core. [...]
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2009 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 390)  
3.
23 p, 238.7 KB Incomplete information and small cores in matching markets / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal.Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. [...]
[S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 147)  
4.
6 p, 97.3 KB A Many-to-many 'rural hospital theorem' / Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' (Roth, 1986) generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences.
2011 (Working papers ; 877.11)  
5.
10 p, 130.1 KB Manipulability in matching markets : conflict and coincidence of interests / Ashlagi, Itai ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 835.10)  
6.
11 p, 1.1 MB A mixed splicing procedure for economic time series / Fuente, Ángel de la ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
This note develops a flexible methodology for splicing economic time series that avoids the extreme assumptions implicit in the procedures most commonly used in the literature. It allows the user to split the required correction to the older of the series being linked between its levels and growth rates on the basis what he knows or conjectures about the persistence of the factors that account for the discrepancy between the two series that emerges at their linking point. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 796.09)  
7.
5 p, 158.4 KB Corrigendum : stable matchings and preferences of couples / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Nakamura, Toshifumi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 708.07)  
8.
32 p, 349.6 KB Constrained school choice / Haeringer, Guillaume ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 671.06)  
9.
28 p, 978.9 KB The principal-agent matching market / Dam, Kaniska ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 503.01)  
10.
18 p, 207.8 KB Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment / Fiestras Janeiro, M. Gloria ; Klijn, Flip ; Sánchez, Estela ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.
2006 (Working papers ; 561.03)  

Documents de recerca : 13 registres trobats   1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
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