Resultats globals: 8 registres trobats en 0.03 segons.
Articles, 5 registres trobats
Contribucions a jornades i congressos, 1 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 2 registres trobats
Articles 5 registres trobats  
1.
27 p, 264.3 KB Indirect tax harmonization and global public goods / Karakosta, Ourania (University of Exeter Business School. Department of Economics) ; Kotsogiannis, Christos (University of Exeter Business School. Department of Economics) ; López García, Miguel Ángel (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia Aplicada)
This paper identifies conditions under which, starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium, destination- and origin-based indirect tax-harmonizing reforms are potentially Pareto improving in the presence of global public goods. [...]
2014 - 10.1007/s10797-012-9246-8
International tax and public finance, Vol. 21 Núm. 1 (February 2014) , p. 29-49  
2.
18 p, 741.4 KB The Production of Step-Level Public Goods in Structured Social Networks : An Agent-Based Simulation / León Medina, Francisco José (Universitat de Girona) ; Alcaide Lozano, Vanessa (Universitat de Barcelona) ; Miguel Quesada, Francisco J. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
This paper presents a multi-agent simulation of the production of step-level public goods in social networks. In previous public goods experimental research the design of the sequence ordering of decisions have been limited because of the necessity of simplicity taking priority over realism, which means they never accurately reproduce the social structure that constrains the available information. [...]
2014 - 10.18564/jasss.2419
Journal of artificial societies and social simulation, Vol. 17 Núm. 1 (2014)  
3.
34 p, 285.9 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova)
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. [...]
2008 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.007
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 64 Núm. 2 (November 2008) , p. 591-611  
4.
25 p, 617.6 KB La lógica de la acción colectiva en la producción de bienes públicos escalares / León Medina, Francisco José (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Sociologia)
En este artículo, abordamos las características distintivas de la lógica de la acción colectiva en la producción de bienes públicos escalares (bienes con puntos de provisión). En el primer apartado, presentamos las diferencias existentes entre las funciones de producción de bienes públicos continuos (BPC) y las de bienes públicos escalares (BPE). [...]
In this paper, we explore the distinctive features of the logic of collective action in the production of step-level public goods. In the first part, we present the differences between the production functions of continuous public goods (here BPC) and those of the step-level public goods (here BPE). [...]

2010 - 10.5565/rev/papers/v95n2.77
Papers : revista de sociologia, Vol. 95, Núm. 2 (abril/juny 2010) , p. 363-387  
5.
9 p, 338.9 KB Modelos de acción colectiva: modelos de cambio social / de Francisco, Andrés
El autor realiza una crítica interna de la teoría analítica de la acción colectiva, tal y como fue formulada por Mancur Olson, mostrando que tanto la racionalidad individual como la colectiva pueden funcionar de forma "perversa" o de forma socialmente beneficiosa, dependiendo del contexto.
The article makes an internal critique of the analytical theory of collective action, as it was established by Mancur Olson. The criticism shows that cither individual or collective rationality can work in a "perverse" way or in a socially useful way, depending on context.

1994 - 10.5565/rev/papers.1746
Papers : revista de sociologia, N. 44 (1994) p. 77-85  

Contribucions a jornades i congressos 1 registres trobats  
1.
8 p, 1.5 MB Partner selection supports reputation-based cooperation in a public goods game / Vilone, Daniele (National Research Council (Italy). Istituto di scienze e tecnologie della cognizione) ; Giardini, Francesca (Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche (Itàlia). Istituto di scienze e tecnologie della cognizione) ; Paolucci, Mario (Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche (Itàlia). Istituto di scienze e tecnologie della cognizione)
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers’ history of giving has a significant impact on the donor’s decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. [...]
2014
Social Simulation Conference. Bellaterra, Cerdanyola del Vallés, 1a : 2014  

Documents de recerca 2 registres trobats  
1.
11 p, 439.3 KB Private sector and environmental conservation management / Mayolas Lacambra, Guillem ; Asensio, Javier, dir. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Apliada) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Facultat de Ciències Polítiques i de Sociologia
This paper tries to evaluate the capabilities of private sector on environmental conservation Markets. It uses the results obtained by the conference on “Conservation Capital in the Americas” held in January 2009. [...]
Aquest treball intenta avaluar les capacitats del sector privat alhora de gestionar els mercats de la conservació del medi ambient. Utilitza els resultats obtinguts per la conferencia “capital de la conservació a les Americas” celebrada el gener de 2009. [...]

2016
Graduat o Graduada en Ciència Política i Gestió Pública [818]
2 documents
2.
29 p, 310.9 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under crowding preferences / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. [...]
[S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 148)  

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