Resultats globals: 9 registres trobats en 0.02 segons.
Articles, 7 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 2 registres trobats
Articles 7 registres trobats  
1.
42 p, 422.0 KB On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness / Catterji, Shurojit (Singapore Management University) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). [...]
2017 - 10.1111/iere.12266
International economic review, 2017  
2.
40 p, 432.7 KB Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. [...]
2016 - 10.3982/TE1910
Theoretical Economics, Vol. 11, Núm. 2 (2016) , p. 547-586
2 documents
3.
55 p, 354.5 KB La moderna teoria de l'elecció social : de la impossibilitat a la possibilitat / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Es presenten els dos teoremes d'impossibilitat més importants de la moderna teoria de l'elecció social: el teorema d'Arrow per a funcions de benestar social no dictatorials que satisfan el principi de Pareto i la propietat de la independència d'alternatives irrellevants, i el teorema de Gibbard-Satterthwaite per a funcions d'elecció social no trivials i no manipulables. [...]
We present the two most important impossibility theorems of the modern social choice theory: Arrow’s theorem for social welfare functions satisfying the Pareto principle and the independence of irrelevant alternatives property, and Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem for non-trivial and strategy-proof social choice functions. [...]

2012 - 10.2436/20.2002.01.45
Butlletí de la Societat Catalana de Matemàtiques, Vol. 27, Num. 2 (2012) , p. 177-231  
4.
19 p, 213.5 KB Bribe-proof rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 61 Núm. 2 (November 2007) , p. 331-343  
5.
26 p, 329.1 KB A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0245-7
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 187-206  
6.
34 p, 343.2 KB On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés (London School of Economics)
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. [...]
2011 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 72 Núm. 2 (2011) , p. 467-484  
7.
48 p, 327.5 KB Voting by committees under constraints / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters’ preferences are separable or additively representable.
2005 - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006
Journal of economic theory, Núm. 122 (2005) , p. 185-205  

Documents de recerca 2 registres trobats  
1.
30 p, 259.5 KB On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi ; Chatterji, Shurojit
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the social choice function satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2015 (Working papers ; 952.15)  
2.
44 p, 336.8 KB Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability / Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three nec- essary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2014 (Working papers ; 946.14)  

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