Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB 12 registres trobats  1 - 10següent  anar al registre: La cerca s'ha fet en 0.01 segons. 
1.
35 p, 428.9 KB Matching Markets under (In)complete Information / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 157 (2015) , p. 295-314  
2.
33 p, 477.2 KB On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (University of Manchester) ; Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute) ; Sharma, Tradib (Centro de Investigación Económica (México)) ; Ülkü, Levent (Centro de Investigación Económica (México))
We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 155 (2015) , p. 30-49  
3.
39 p, 288.8 KB On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game : limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. [...]
2014 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 154 (2014) , p. 185-215  
4.
28 p, 694.1 KB The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically / Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira (Universidade de São Paulo)
We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer–seller market of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. [...]
2016 - 10.1007/s00199-016-0997-9
Economic theory, September 2016, p. 1-21  
5.
38 p, 701.6 KB Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues / Diamantoudi, Effrosyny (Concordia University) ; Macho-Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Xue, Licun (McGill University)
We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues, that is, the amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the players are organized on all the issues. [...]
2015 - 10.1007/s00199-015-0867-x
Economic theory, Vol. 60, Num. 2 (2015) , p. 315-343  
6.
36 p, 825.2 KB Codes of best practices in competitive markets for managers / Alonso-Paulí, Eduard (Universidad Pablo Olavide) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia)
We study the corporate governance of firms in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00199-010-0537-y
Economic theory, Vol. 49, Num. 1 (2012) , p. 113-141  
7.
11 p, 143.5 KB Measuring social polarization with ordinal and categorical data / Permanyer, Iñaki (Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics) ; D'Ambrosio, Conchita (Université du Luxembourg)
We examine the measurement of social polarization with categorical and ordinal data. We partition the society into groups on the basis of salient social characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, and we take into account the extent to which these groups are clustered in certain regions of an attribute's distribution. [...]
2015 - 10.1111/jpet.12093
Journal of public economic theory, Vol. 17 Núm. 3 (June 2015) , p. 311-327
2 documents
8.
31 p, 289.0 KB Weighted approval voting / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Vorsatz, Marc (Maastricht University)
To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a strictly positive and finite weight. [...]
2008 - 10.1007/s00199-007-0263-2
Economic theory, Vol. 36 Núm. 1 (July 2008) , p. 129-146  
9.
15 p, 190.9 KB Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. [...]
2000 - 10.1006/jeth.1999.2586
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 91 Núm. 1 (March 2000) , p. 91-105  
10.
27 p, 240.7 KB Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de Sciences Économiques.) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
Journal of economic theory, Núm. 136 (2007) , p. 587-600  

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB : 12 registres trobats   1 - 10següent  anar al registre:
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