Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB 10 registres trobats  La cerca s'ha fet en 0.01 segons. 
1.
40 p, 301.1 KB The Division Problem under Constraints / Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 89 (2015) , p. 56-77  
2.
42 p, 1.3 MB Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts / Macho-Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás (Universidad Pablo Olavide)
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. [...]
2014 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.013
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 86 (2014) , p. 145-164  
3.
20 p, 607.8 KB Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information / Clippel, Geoffroy de (Brown University) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler’s (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were un-der complete information. [...]
2012
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 75, Num. 1 (2012) , p. 413-423  
4.
34 p, 285.9 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova)
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. [...]
2008 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.007
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 64 Núm. 2 (November 2008) , p. 591-611  
5.
41 p, 254.2 KB Maximal domain of preferences for the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2001 - 10.1006/game.2001.0850
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 37 Núm. 2 (November 2001) , p. 367-387  
6.
19 p, 213.5 KB Bribe-proof rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 61 Núm. 2 (November 2007) , p. 331-343  
7.
34 p, 343.2 KB On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés (London School of Economics)
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. [...]
2011 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 72 Núm. 2 (2011) , p. 467-484  
8.
26 p, 248.5 KB On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. [...]
2012 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.011
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 74 Núm. 2 (March 2012) , p. 588-600  
9.
13 p, 183.2 KB Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model / Klijn, Flip (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica)
In this note we introduce weak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. The new concept is based on threats within blocking pairs: an individually rational matching is weakly stable if for every blocking pair one of the members can find a more attractive partner with whom he forms another blocking pair for the original matching. [...]
2003 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00534-1
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 42 Núm. 1 (January 2003) , p. 91-100  
10.
23 p, 252.6 KB Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) ; Serizawa, Shigehiro (Shiga University. Departament of Economics)
Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. [...]
1998 - 10.1006/game.1997.0643
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 25 Núm. 2 (1998) , p. 272-291  

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