Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB 6 registres trobats  La cerca s'ha fet en 0.02 segons. 
1.
30 p, 322.3 KB On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets / Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira (Universidade de São Paulo)
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
International journal of game theory, 2017, p. 1-25  
2.
10 p, 585.3 KB Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities / Macho-Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Wettstein, David (University of Negev)
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339–356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. [...]
2010 - 10.1007/s00182-009-0207-0
International journal of game theory, Vol. 39, Num. 1 (2010) , p. 177-184  
3.
29 p, 1.1 MB Sequential coalition formation through bilateral agreements in a cournot setting / Macho-Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia) ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás (Universidad Pablo Olavide. Departament d'Economia)
We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. [...]
2006 - 10.1007/s00182-006-0017-6
International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 (2006) , p. 207-228  
4.
29 p, 245.3 KB On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)))
For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. [...]
2007 - 10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7
International journal of game theory, Vol. 36 Núm. 3 (October 2007) , p. 497-518  
5.
19 p, 282.5 KB On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one maching model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)))
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s001820400189
International journal of game theory, Vol. 33 Núm. 1 (Decemberq 2004) , p. 115-128  
6.
24 p, 238.4 KB On exiting after voting / Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. [...]
2006 - 10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2
International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 Núm. 1 (2006) , p. 33-54  

Us interessa rebre alertes sobre nous resultats d'aquesta cerca?
Definiu una alerta personal via correu electrònic o subscribiu-vos al canal RSS.