Depósito Digital de Documentos de la UAB Encontrados 5 registros  La búsqueda tardó 0.01 segundos. 
1.
23 p, 342.8 KB On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships : Strategy-proofness / Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidad de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 48, Núm. 4 (2017) , p. 857-875  
2.
26 p, 329.1 KB A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0245-7
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 187-206  
3.
43 p, 342.5 KB The division problem with voluntary participation / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00355-011-0530-9
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 38 Núm. 3 (March 2012) , p. 371-406  
4.
32 p, 305.8 KB Stability and voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 229-247  
5.
21 p, 235.4 KB Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.
1999 - 10.1007/s003550050146
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 16 Núm. 2 (1999) , p. 321-336  

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