On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness - Search Results

Search collections:

Sort by:	Display results:	Output format:

Results overview: Found 3 records in 0.05 seconds.
Articles, 2 records found Research literature, 1 records found

Articles	2 records found

12 p, 306.1 KB

Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219-238] / Bonifacio, Agustín G. (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
As was pointed out to us by Huaxia Zeng, Theorem 1 in Bonifacio and Massó (2020), is not correct. In this note we recall former Theorem 1, exhibit a counterexample of its statement, identify the mistake in its faulty proof, and state and prove the new version of Theorem 1. [...]
2021 - DOI (Digital Object Identifier)

10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.015
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 130 (2021) , p. 684-689

Detailed record -

53 p, 597.0 KB

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness / Bonifacio, Agustín G. (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. [...]
2020 - DOI (Digital Object Identifier)

10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 124 (2020) , p. 219-238

Detailed record -

Research literature	1 records found

39 p, 340.5 KB

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness / Bonifacio, Agustín G. ; Massó, Jordi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmic; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica 2019 (Working papers ; 965.19)

Detailed record -

Interested in being notified about new results for this query?
Set up a personal email alert or subscribe to the RSS feed.