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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB 71 registres trobats  1 - 10següentfinal  anar al registre: La cerca s'ha fet en 0.01 segons. 
1.
21 p, 257.6 KB Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness : the case of single-dipped preferences / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Campus de El Ejido) ; MOVE- Markets, Organizations and Votes in Economics
We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules' range. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2009 (BSE working paper ; 418)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2009  
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2.
32 p, 252.5 KB Choosing how to choose : self-stable majority rules and constitutions / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Jackson, Matthew O. (California Institute of Technology (Estats Units d'Amèrica)) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2003 (BSE working paper ; 57)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2003  
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3.
30 p, 255.9 KB Locating public facilities by majority : stability, consistency and group formation / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Beviá, Carmen (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. [...]
Barcelona Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica, 2004 (BSE working paper ; 128)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2004  
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4.
19 p, 179.2 KB Free triples, large indifference vlasses and the majority rule / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We study classes of voting situations where agents may exhibit a systematic inability to distinguish between the elements of certain sets of alternatives. These sets of alternatives may differ from voter to voter, thus resulting in personalized families of preferences. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2007 (BSE working paper ; 15)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2007  
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5.
31 p, 366.1 KB Top monotonicity : a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Universidad de Málaga)
When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the voters' most preferred alternatives. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2010 (BSE working paper ; 297)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2010  
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6.
39 p, 256.9 KB On the rule of k names / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Coelho, Danilo (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2007 (BSE working paper ; 264)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2004  
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7.
10 p, 205.3 KB A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Gerber, Anke (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Grup de Recerca Coalicions, Incentius i Xarxes en la Presa de Decisions Col·lectives) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2005 (BSE working paper ; 248)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2005  
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8.
17 p, 184.9 KB Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Grodal, Birgit (Københavns Universitet) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
A decision-maker exhibits preference for flexibility if he always prefers any set of alternatives to its subsets, even when two of them contain the same best element. Desire for flexibility can be explained as the consequence of the agent's uncertainty along a two-stage process, where he must first preselect a subset of alternatives from which to make a final choice later on. [...]
Barcelona School of Economics, 2003 (BSE working paper ; 2)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2003  
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9.
27 p, 610.4 KB Order-k rationality / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; de Clippel, Geoffroy (Brown University) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Rozen, Kareen (Brown University)
A decision maker (DM) may not perfectly maximize her preference over the feasible set. She may feel it is good enough to maximize her preference over a sufficiently large consideration set; or just require that her choice is sufficiently well-ranked (e. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2019 (BSE working paper ; 1130)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2019  
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10.
29 p, 333.4 KB Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Bossert, Walter (University of Montreal) ; Suzumura, Kotaro (Waseda University)
Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2019 (BSE working paper ; 1107)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2019  
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB : 71 registres trobats   1 - 10següentfinal  anar al registre:
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