Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB 26 registres trobats  1 - 10següentfinal  anar al registre: La cerca s'ha fet en 0.00 segons. 
1.
13 p, 183.2 KB Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model / Klijn, Flip (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
In this note we introduce weak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. The new concept is based on threats within blocking pairs: an individually rational matching is weakly stable if for every blocking pair one of the members can find a more attractive partner with whom he forms another blocking pair for the original matching. [...]
2003 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00534-1
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 42 Núm. 1 (January 2003) , p. 91-100  
2.
10 p, 260.7 KB Some things couples wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) / Klaus, Bettina (Maastricht University. Department of Economics) ; Klijn, Flip (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. [...]
2007 - 10.1007/s10058-006-0017-9
Review of economic design, Núm. 11 (2007) , p. 175-184  
3.
10 p, 245.8 KB Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) / Klaus, Bettina (Maastricht University. Department of Economics) ; Klijn, Flip (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica.
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. [...]
Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2005 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 78)  
4.
6 p, 97.3 KB A Many-to-many 'rural hospital theorem' / Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' (Roth, 1986) generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences.
2011 (Working papers ; 877.11)  
5.
17 p, 194.2 KB Local and global consistency properties for student placement / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 866.11)  
6.
10 p, 130.1 KB Manipulability in matching markets : conflict and coincidence of interests / Ashlagi, Itai ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 835.10)  
7.
42 p, 554.0 KB Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice : a laboratory experiment / Klijn, Flip ; Pais, Joana ; Vorsatz, Marc ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 816.10)  
8.
31 p, 234.2 KB Constrained school choice : an experimental study / Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Haeringer, Guillaume ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. [...]
2008 (Working papers ; 757.08)  
9.
5 p, 158.4 KB Corrigendum : stable matchings and preferences of couples / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Nakamura, Toshifumi ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 708.07)  
10.
9 p, 180.7 KB Smith and Rawls share a room / Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ``lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 706.07)  

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB : 26 registres trobats   1 - 10següentfinal  anar al registre:
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