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1.
3 p, 158.0 KB Correction to : The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework (Social Choice and Welfare, (2021), 10.1007/s00355-021-01372-5) / Alabert, Aureli (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Matemàtiques) ; Farré, Mercè (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Matemàtiques)
The production team incorrectly processed the author names in the reference list by mistake in the original publication of the article.
2021 - 10.1007/s00355-021-01380-5
Social Choice and Welfare, (December 2021)  
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2.
33 p, 2.1 MB The doctrinal paradox : comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework / Alabert, Aureli (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Matemàtiques) ; Farré, Mercè (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Matemàtiques)
The doctrinal paradox is analysed from a probabilistic point of view assuming a simple parametric model for the committee's behaviour. The well known premise-based and conclusion-based majority rules are compared in this model, by means of the concepts of false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR) and Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) space. [...]
2021 - 10.1007/s00355-021-01372-5
Social Choice and Welfare, (November 2021)  
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3.
40 p, 364.4 KB Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information / Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge (Universidad Pública de Navarra) ; Arlegi, Ricardo (Universidad Pública de Navarra) ; Ballester, Miguel Ángel (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We present a model that is closely related to the so-called models of choice under complete uncertainty, in which the agent has no information about the probability of the outcomes. There are two approaches within the said models: the state space-based approach, which takes into account the possible states of nature and the correspondence between states and outcomes; and the set-based approach, which ignores such information, and solves certain diculties arising from the state space-based approach. [...]
2013 - 10.1007/s00355-012-0689-8
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 41 Núm. 2 (juliol 2013) , p. 397-425  
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4.
48 p, 431.5 KB Measuring poverty in multidimensional contexts / Permanyer, Iñaki (Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics)
When measuring multidimensional poverty it is reasonable to expect that the trade-offs between variable pairs can differ depending on whether the concerned pairs are complements or substitutes. Yet, currently existing approaches based on deprivation count distributions unrealistically assume that all pairs of variables are related in the same way-an unfortunate circumstance that undermines the possibilities of identifying the poor, aggregating their poverty levels and modeling non-trivial interactions between variables in highly flexible ways. [...]
2019 - 10.1007/s00355-019-01207-4
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 53 Núm. 4 (2019) , p. 677-708  
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5.
51 p, 394.4 KB On the measurement of multidimensional poverty in multiple domain contexts / Permanyer, Iñaki
We develop the measurement of multidimensional poverty for the case in which the different dimensions taken into account are partitioned in several domains-an issue with crucial implications for the identification and aggregation of the poor which has been neglected in the literature. [...]
2016
Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Lund (Suècia), 13è : 2016  
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6.
23 p, 342.8 KB On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships : Strategy-proofness / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 48, Núm. 4 (2017) , p. 857-875  
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7.
26 p, 329.1 KB A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0245-7
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 187-206  
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8.
43 p, 342.5 KB The division problem with voluntary participation / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. [...]
2012 - 10.1007/s00355-011-0530-9
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 38 Núm. 3 (March 2012) , p. 371-406  
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9.
32 p, 305.8 KB Stability and voting by committees with exit / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 229-247  
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10.
21 p, 235.4 KB Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.
1999 - 10.1007/s003550050146
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 16 Núm. 2 (1999) , p. 321-336  
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