Home > Search Results: Theoretical economics
  Search Tips
Advanced Search
Search collections:
Sort by: Display results: Output format:
UAB Digital Repository of Documents 4 records found  Search took 0.10 seconds. 
1.
39 p, 443.6 KB All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
2023 - 10.3982/TE5111
Theoretical economics, Vol. 18 Núm. 3 (2023) , p. 1023-1061  
Detailed record - Creative Commons
2.
37 p, 276.7 KB Sequential voting and agenda manipulation / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Gerber, Anke (University of Hamburg. Department of Economics)
We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. [...]
2017 - 10.3982/TE2118
Theoretical economics, Vol. 12 Núm. 1 (gener 2017) , p. 211-247  
Detailed record - Creative Commons
3.
42 p, 319.5 KB Communication and influence / Calvó-Armengol, Antoni (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Martí Beltran, Joan de (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) ; Prat, Andrea (Columbia University)
We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). [...]
2015 - 10.3982/TE1468
Theoretical economics, Vol. 10 Núm. 2 (2015)  
Detailed record - Creative Commons
4.
40 p, 432.7 KB Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. [...]
2016 - 10.3982/TE1910
Theoretical economics, Vol. 11, Núm. 2 (2016) , p. 547-586
2 documents
Detailed record - Creative Commons

Interested in being notified about new results for this query?
Set up a personal email alert or subscribe to the RSS feed.
UAB Digital Repository of Documents :: Search :: Submit :: Personalize :: Help
Powered by Invenio v1.1.6
Maintained by ddd.bib@uab.cat  :: Metadata license:
Working with