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Depósito Digital de Documentos de la UAB Encontrados 7 registros  La búsqueda tardó 0.02 segundos. 
1.
29 p, 325.1 KB Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation / Calvó-Armengol, Antoni (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada) ; Ilkılıç, Rahmi (Universiteit Maastricht. Department of Economics)
Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. [...]
2009 - 10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7
International journal of game theory, Vol. 38 (2009) , p. 51-79  
Registro completo - Creative Commons
2.
30 p, 322.3 KB On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets / Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira (Universidade de São Paulo)
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. [...]
2017 - 10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
International journal of game theory, 2017, p. 1-25  
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3.
10 p, 585.3 KB Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities / Macho Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Wettstein, David (University of Negev)
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. [...]
2010 - 10.1007/s00182-009-0207-0
International journal of game theory, Vol. 39, Num. 1 (2010) , p. 177-184  
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4.
29 p, 1.1 MB Sequential coalition formation through bilateral agreements in a cournot setting / Macho Stadler, Inés (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás (Universidad Pablo de Olavide. Departamento de Economía)
We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. [...]
2006 - 10.1007/s00182-006-0017-6
International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 (2006) , p. 207-228  
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5.
29 p, 245.3 KB On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)))
For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. [...]
2007 - 10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7
International journal of game theory, Vol. 36 Núm. 3 (October 2007) , p. 497-518  
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6.
19 p, 282.5 KB On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one maching model / Martínez, Ruth (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))) ; Oviedo, Jorge (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)))
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s001820400189
International journal of game theory, Vol. 33 Núm. 1 (Decemberq 2004) , p. 115-128  
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7.
24 p, 238.4 KB On exiting after voting / Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia) ; Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. [...]
2006 - 10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2
International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 Núm. 1 (2006) , p. 33-54  
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