Resultats globals: 5 registres trobats en 0.02 segons.
Articles, 2 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 3 registres trobats
Articles 2 registres trobats  
1.
33 p, 477.2 KB On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (University of Manchester) ; Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute) ; Sharma, Tradib (Centro de Investigación Económica (México)) ; Ülkü, Levent (Centro de Investigación Económica (México))
We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 155 (2015) , p. 30-49  
2.
34 p, 285.9 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova)
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. [...]
2008 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.007
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 64 Núm. 2 (November 2008) , p. 591-611  

Documents de recerca 3 registres trobats  
1.
52 p, 488.9 KB Pairwise justifiable changes in collective choices / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Universidad de Málaga) ; Nicolò, Antonio (University of Padova)
Consider the following principle regarding the performance of collective choice rules. "If a rule selects alternative x in situation 1, and alternative y in situation 2, there must be an alternative z, and some member of society whose appreciation of z relative to x has increased when going from situation 1 to situation 2. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2022 (BSE working paper ; 1256)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2022  
2.
29 p, 310.9 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under crowding preferences / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. [...]
[S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 148)  
3.
37 p, 271.0 KB Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / Massó, Jordi ; Nicolò, Antonio ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. [...]
2007 (Working papers ; 714.07)  

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9 Nicoló, Antonio
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