Selecting negotiation processes with health care providers
Martínez Giralt, Xavier (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Barros, Pedro Pita (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica

Publicació: Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004
Descripció: 22 p.
Resum: We address the question of how a third-party payer (e. g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Two different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the thirdparty payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers. The second mechanism is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select a negotiated solution.
Drets: Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua: Anglès
Col·lecció: Barcelona economics working papers series; 30
Document: Working paper
Matèria: Negociació ; Assistència sanitaria ; Bargaining ; Health care provision ; Any willing provider

Adreça alternativa: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/30.pdf


22 p, 119.1 KB

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Documents de recerca > Working papers

 Registre creat el 2015-10-26, darrera modificació el 2022-09-04



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