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Working papers
Recull de documents que sintetitzen una recerca original sobre un tema concret dins d’una matèria o camp d’estudi, amb el propòsit d’informar sobre l’estat de la recerca. Ajuden a descobrir noves idees i conceptes i a perfilar línies de recerca especialmente als àmbits de les ciències socials i les humanitats. Destaquen els del Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, l’Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials o els del Centre d’Estudis Olímpics de la UAB.
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2024-07-24
11:08
20 p, 9.2 MB Relación entre el ingreso de las mujeres y su trabajo doméstico. Un análisis para las parejas argentinas / Trincheri, Tania Melisa (Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (Argentina)) ; Gómez, María Celeste (Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (Argentina))
A pesar de su importancia para el funcionamiento del sistema económico, el trabajo doméstico y de cuidados no remunerado (TDCNR) ha sido históricamente feminizado e invisibilizado, mediante la naturalización de las desigualdades en ámbitos domésticos y laborales. [...]
2024 (INCASI Working Paper Series; 12)  
Registre complet - Creative Commons
2024-07-20
14:54
48 p, 489.0 KB All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. [...]
Barcelona: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics 2019 (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series ; 1108)
GSE Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2019  
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2024-07-10
05:56
45 p, 404.1 KB Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. [...]
Barcelona: GSE Working Papers; 2014 (GSE working paper; 753)
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2014  
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2024-07-10
05:56
31 p, 363.5 KB On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness / Chatterji, Shurojit (Singapore Management University) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference pro les. We show that if the social choice function satis es in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). [...]
Barcelona: GSE Working Papers, 2015 (GSE working paper; 828)
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2015  
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2024-07-10
05:56
40 p, 443.0 KB On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness / Bonifacio, Agustín G. (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. [...]
Barcelona: GSE Working Papers, 2019 (GSE working paper; 1087)
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2009  
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2024-07-06
10:16
21 p, 479.8 KB False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences / Fioravanti, Federico (University of Amsterdam) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica)
We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to select a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues or alike). We assume that voters' preferences over subsets of objects are separable: Adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). [...]
2023 - 10.2139/ssrn.4175113  
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2024-07-04
07:13
40 p, 1.9 MB The great Gatsby curve and the Carnegie effect / Alonso Carrera, Jaime (Universidad de Vigo) ; Caballé, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Raurich, Xavier (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We show that US commuting zones with higher income inequality exhibit less upward social mobility at the bottom of the income distribution, more downward social mobility at the top, and lower average income. [...]
Barcelona: BSE Working Papers, 2024 (BSE working paper; 1451)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2024  
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2024-06-29
07:09
41 p, 5.5 MB A general equilibrium analysis of the indirect tax reform in Spain / Kehoe, Timothy J. (Cambridge University) ; Manresa, Antonio 1954- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Noyola, Pedro J. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Polo, Clemente (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Sancho Pifarré, Ferran (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Serra-Puche, J. (Colegio de México)
México: Centro de Estudios Económicos. El colegio de México ; 1988 (Documentos de trabajo 11)  
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2024-06-28
05:44
47 p, 521.8 KB On the endogenous order of play in sequential games / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Gerber, Anke (Universitat Hamburg)
We formalize, under the name of games of addition, the strategic interaction between agents that can play non-simultaneously by adding payoff relevant actions to those that any other players or themselves have already taken previously, but may also agree unanimously to stop adding them and collect the payoffs associated with the truncated sequence of moves. [...]
Barcelona: BSE Working Paper; 2024 (BSE working paper; 1443)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2024  
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2024-06-27
06:21
36 p, 303.8 KB Mechanisms to appoint arbitrator panels or sets of judges by compromise between concerned parties / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Coelho, Danilo
We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially con. icting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two con. [...]
Barcelona: BSE Working Paper; 2024 (BSE working paper; 1442)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2024  
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Departament d'Economia Aplicada. Documents de treball (217)
Departament d'Empresa. Documents de treball (125)
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Unitat d'Historia Econòmica. Documents de treball (127)
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