On exiting after voting
Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia)
Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))

Date:	2006
Abstract:	We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undesirable to belong to the society as well. For general exit procedures we analyze the exit behavior of members after knowing the chosen alternative. For the case of monotonic preferences we propose, for each chosen alternative, an unambiguous and meaningful prediction of the subset of members that will exit.
Grants:	Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación BEC2002-04102-C02-01 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEJ2004-03276 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación AGL2001-2333-C02-01 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación BEC2002-02130 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2001-SGR-00162
Note:	We thank Salvador Barberà, Carmen Beviá, David Cantala, Howard Petith, William Thomson, Marc Vorsatz, and Associate Editor, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. The work of D. Berga is partially supported by Research Grants 9101100 from the Universitat de Girona, and also by AGL2001-2333-C02-01 and SEJ2004- 03276 from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, respectively. The work of G. Bergantiños is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-04102-C02-01 from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and PGIDIT03PXIC30002PN from the Xunta de Galicia. The work of J. Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The work of D. Berga and J. Massó is also partially supported by the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA). The work of A. Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis.
Note:	Altres ajuts: Xunta de Gal·lícia GIDIT03PXIC30002PN
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió
Subject:	Voting ; Exit ; Subgame ; Perfect Equilibrium
Published in:	International journal of game theory, Vol. 34 Núm. 1 (2006) , p. 33-54, ISSN 0020-7276

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2

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