Weighted approval voting
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Vorsatz, Marc (Maastricht University)

Fecha:	2008
Resumen:	To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a strictly positive and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects the alternative for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. If the product is maximal for more than one alternative, a pre-specified tie-breaking rule is applied. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this family of voting procedures.
Ayudas:	Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2005-04081 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2005/SGR-00454
Nota:	We thank Salvador Barberà for his helpful comments at early stages of this research. We also thank Miguel Ángel Ballester, Steven Brams, Antonio Nicolò, Pedro Rey, Arunava Sen, John Weymark, and the participants of the UAB Lunch Seminar on Game Theory and Social Choice for their useful comments and suggestions. The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia through grant SEJ2005-04081 and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA) and the grant SGR2005-00454.
Derechos:	Tots els drets reservats.
Lengua:	Anglès
Documento:	Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió
Materia:	Vot ; Approval voting ; Neutrality
Publicado en:	Economic theory, Vol. 36 Núm. 1 (July 2008) , p. 129-146, ISSN 1432-0479

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0263-2

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