Reliabilist epistemology meets bounded rationality
Dusi, Giovanni (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Filosofia)

Date:	2024
Abstract:	Epistemic reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable or truth-conducive process. I argue that reliabilism offers an epistemology for bounded rationality. This latter concept refers to normative and descriptive accounts of real-world reasoning instead of some ideal reasoning. However, as initially formulated, reliabilism involves an absolute, context-independent assessment of rationality that does not do justice to the fact that several processes are reliable in some reasoning environments but not in others, as is widely reported in the cognitive sciences literature. I consider possible solutions to this problem. Resorting to 'normality reliabilism', a variant of the theory, is one; but I find it insufficient. Therefore, in addition, I propose to relativise the reliability assessment to reasoning environments. This novel version of reliabilism fits bounded rationality better than the original one does.
Note:	Altres ajuts: acords transformatius de la UAB
Note:	Open Access Funding provided by Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. This work was supported by the Secretariat for Universities and Research of the Catalonian Department of Business and Knowledge and the European Social Fund.
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Process reliabilism ; Ecological rationality ; Heuristics and biases ; Normality reliabilism ; Heuristics ; Reasoning environments
Published in:	Synthese (Dordrecht), Vol. 203 Núm. 4 (april 2024) , article 115, ISSN 1573-0964

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04525-y

21 p, 328.0 KB

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