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36 p, 336.0 KB Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions / Dechenauxy, Emmanuel ; Kovenock, Dan ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 645.05)  

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