Partner selection supports reputation-based cooperation in a public goods game
Vilone, Daniele (National Research Council (Italy). Istituto di scienze e tecnologie della cognizione)
Giardini, Francesca (Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche (Itàlia). Istituto di scienze e tecnologie della cognizione)
Paolucci, Mario (Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche (Itàlia). Istituto di scienze e tecnologie della cognizione)
Date: |
2014 |
Abstract: |
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the evolution of cooperation and whether this is affected by the kind of network structure adopted. Moreover, if agents interact on a bipartite graph with partner selection cooperation can thrive in large groups and in a small amount of time. |
Rights: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades. |
Language: |
Anglès |
Document: |
Comunicació de congrés |
Subject: |
Evolution of cooperation ;
Public goods game ;
Network ;
Reputation |
Published in: |
Social Simulation Conference. Bellaterra, Cerdanyola del Vallés, 1a : 2014 |
Podeu consultar la compilació de les ponències presentades a Social Simulation Conference a: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597
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Record created 2015-01-09, last modified 2022-06-04